Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1979

Johnson Tire Service Inc. v. Thorn, Inc. : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Layne T. Rushforth; Jackman & Associates; Attorney for Appellant;
Steven E. Stewart; Attorney for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Johnson Tire Service v. Thorn, Inc., No. 16625 (Utah Supreme Court, 1979).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1908

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JOHNSON TIRE SERVICE, INC.,
A Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

No. 16,625

THORN, INC., A Utah Corporation,
Defendant and Appellee.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Appeal from the Judgment of the Fourth
Judicial District Court for Utah County
Hon. David Sam, Judge

LAYNE T. RUSHFORTH
Attorney for the Plaintiff
Suite 10, Broderick & Howell Bld
930 South State Street
Orem, Utah
84057
STEVEN H. STEWART
Stewart, Young, Paxton & Russell
Attorneys for the Defendant
Suite 450, The Chancellor Bldg.
220 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

F ~ l ED
SEP 17 1979

--------------------------------------

(:10~ Suprome Court. Utoh
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute
of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CCN1'ENI'S
Contents
NATURE OF THE CASE
DISPOSITIOO IN THE I£MER COORT

RELIEF

~

00 APPEAL

•

STATEMENI' OF THE FJ\CTS

s

STATEMENI' OF POINl'S 00 APPEAL

AKiUMENI'S

Point One:

Point Two:

The terms of credit on plaintiff's invoices

are binding additional terms within the
meaning of § 70A-2-207 U.C.A.

6

Attorneys' fees are incidental damages
owed to the plaintiff by the breaching
defendant-buyer under § ?OA-2-710 U.C.A.

10

Point Three:

The parties' course of dealings established a contractual obligation on the
defendant to pay the plaintiff's attorneys'
fees
11

Point Four:

Attorneys' fees should have been awarded
under the canoc>n-law principles of contract
law, and previous cases decided by this
Court are inapposite.
13
16

COOCLUSIOO

AU'IHORITIES CITED
Authority
Spanish Fork Packing Canpany v. House of Fine
Meats, Inc., 29 Utah 2d 312, 508 P.2d 442,
503 P.2d 1186 (1973) (dissenting opinion by
J. Henriod relied upon and majority opinion
distinguished and criticized)

8, 9, 13, 14

B & R Supply Canpany v. Bringhur~t, .28 Utah
2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216 (1972) (maJonty
opinion distinguished and criticized)

8, 9, 13, 14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-i-contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR, may

Authority
Slim Olson v. Winegar, 122 Utah 80, 246
P. 2d 608 (1952)

77 C.J .s., Sales,

14
§ 71

11

Official Carments to the Uniform Canmercial Code by the National Conference
of Camlissioners on Uniform State Laws

7, 9, 10

STATUTES CITED
§

70A-2-101 U.C.A.

6

§

70A-2-202 U.C.A.

5, 16

s 70A-2-204

u.c.A.

11, 12

§

70A-2-207 U.C.A.

5-9, 16

§

70A-2-208 U.C.A.

5, 16

§

70A-2-710 U.C.A.

5, 10, 16

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-iiMachine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the plaintiff-seller to collect the purchase
price of large-equi:EJllent tires, interest thereon, and attorneys' fees
fran the defendant-buyer who failed to make timely payment thereof on

its open account with the plaintiff.

DISPC\SITIOO IN THE L<l'IER COURT
The Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, the
Honorable David

Sam

presiding, granted partial slllllllary judgment to the

plaintiff wherein the Court awarded the principal purchase price and
interest thereon to the plaintiff.. The Court also granted partial
surrmary judgment to the defendant wherein the Court denied the plaintiff's
claim for attorneys' fees.

RELIEF SOOOHT IN THE PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL
The plaintiff seeks reversal of simmary judgment granted the defendant denying the plaintiff'.s claim for attorneys' fees, judgment for
cost in the Court below and on appeal, and, if necessary, remand for the
determination of the proper airount of such fees and costs.

THE FACTS OF THE CASE
1.

The plaintiff, Johnson Tire Service, Inc., is a merchant which

sells tires and related products.

The defendant, Thorn, Inc., is a ready-

mix concrete merchant which renders products and services relating to the
construction industry.

Since the late 1960s, the plaintiff has sold tires,

as well as related products and services, to the defendant on an open
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account.
2.

During the time in which the parties have been doing business

with one another, the defendant custanarily ordered the goods on an
'
authorized purchase order which frequently did not contain any terms
except a description of the goods.

Johnson Tire, the plaintiff, acknow-

ledged and accepted the buyer's offer to purchase by sending an invoice
which, if signed by' an emPloyee of the defendant, was followed by delivery
of the tires ordered.
3.

In approximately 1973, the plaintiff modified its invoices to

reflect the exact terms and conditions of the sales agreement.

Since

that time all invoices sent to the defendant and other purchasers contained
the follO'o111ing legend:
TITLE REMAINS WITH SELLER UNTIL PAID. BUYER PRCMISES TO PAY
Kr SPRINGVILLE, UTAH.
FINANCE CHARGE AT .ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE OF 18 PERCENT CHARGED ON PN:l At-DUNT UNPAID AFTER
30 DAYS FRa'4 DATE HEREOF. BUYER AG.REES TO PAY COSTS OF COLLFX:TION,
INCLUDING ~LE ATIDRNEY FEES, WITH OR WITHOUT SUIT.

J.l!Xl)UNT

4.

At the beginning of 1978, the defendant's account with the

plaintiff shO'o111ed an unpaid ~lance of $567.70,

As additional purchases

were made during the year, the unpaid balance gradually increased.
5.

In May of 1978, with an unpaid-balance of $1,406.34 in its

account with the plaintiff, the defendant ordered four heavy-duty Michelin
equiµnent tires (custanarily used on front-end loaders) at a cost of
$6,020.79, includi.ng taxes.
6.

The plaintiff sent regular monthly statements to the defendant,

but received only partial payments.
7.

Representatives of the plaintiff met with a representative

of the defendant, Jerry Thorn, in August, 1978 and requested that the ac-
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count be paid in full.

Mr. Thorn pranised to have the account fully

paid by October, 1978.
B.

During the August, 1978 meeting, Mr. Thorn objected to the

rate of interest or service charge added to its ac6ount, but n0 agreement was made to change that rate.
9.

During the course of dealings between the parties, the plaintiff

has consistently applied the defendant's payments first against accrued
service charges ("interest") and then against principal.

Unpaid service

charges have been added to principal for the caipltation of subsequent
service charges.
10.

The defendant's open account with the plaintiff, as of the

time of the plaintiff's motion for sU11111ary judgment (February 10; 1979),
reflected an unpaid balance of $567.70 for 1977, purchases of $7,240.44,
service charges ("interest") of $950.21, and total payments or credits
of $1,590.26, leaving an unpaid balance of $7,168.09.

The last payment

prior to that time was received on December 22, 1978.
11.

In January of 1979, the plaintiff' referred the defendant's

account to its attorney for collection for a contingent fee of 25% of
all amounts collected if suit were required.

The defendant failed to

respond to demands by the plaintiff and by plaintiff's attorney, and
suit was ccmnenced in the Fourth Judicial District Court in Utah Co1mty.
12.

At all times pertinent herein, the defendant, by and through

its agents, were aware of the content of the plaintiff's invoices.

The

provisions on the bottan of the plaintiff's invoices were discussed with
Jerry Thorn in his office at Thorn, Inc.

Mr. Thorn, who represented him-

self as having powers to negotiate in behalf of the defendant and who is
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an attorney, was well aware that such terms were part of the bargain
with the plaintiff.

Objection to those terms was not made within a

reasonable time.
13. On all forms used by the plaintiff, the provisions regarding
the service charge were not in "fine print", but rather in extra bold
lettering showing the annual percentage rate.

The bold lettering would

attract a merchant's attention to the provisions for the interest charges
and the costs of collection, including reasonable attorneys' fees.
14. The terms of credit in the plaintiff's invoices were standard
and are typically used by other merchants in this state, including the
defendant.
15. The plaintiff's partial stmil\ary judgment for principal and
interest was satisfied and all garnishments therefor were released upon
receipt of payment fran the defendant in the amount of $7, 799. 1O on
July 30, 1979.

[Substantiated by the District Court file.)

16. On the principal sale of $6,020.79, the plaintiff was to
have made sane $250 profit. While it recovered the principal, the
plaintiff had attorneys' fees of sane $1,950 which, although reasonable,
put the non-breaching plaintiff-seller in the position of being forced
to sell goods at a loss because of the defendant-buyer's delinquency in

making payment.

[Not in the record, but added to focus the plaintiff's

arguments.]
SUBST.ANTIATIOO FRCM REX:DRD:

Unless otherwise indicated, the facts

herein cited are substantiated principally fran the plaintiffs Statement
of Facts in support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and
supplemented by the Affidavit submitted therewith and the plaintiff's

Sponsored byReply
the S.J.Statement
Quinney Lawwhich
Library.were
Funding
for digitization
provided
by thein
Institute
Museum and
adopted
by the
Court
its of
Findings
ofLibrary
Fact.Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-4-

STA'l'EMENl' OF POINTS
POINT OOE: BINDnxi ADDITIOOAL

~-

Since both the plaintiff

and the defendant are merchants, the provision in the plaintiffs
invoices regarding attorneys' fees established a contractual obligation on thedefendant to pay the plaintiff's attorneys' fees
under the provisions of

§

70A-2-207 of the Utah Uniform Callnercial

Code (cited "Utah U::C").

POINT 'BID: nt:IDENI'AL I>J.l.M.AGES.

The District Court erred in

failing to award its attorneys' fees as "incidental damages" (to the
plaintiff - seller] resulting fran the defendant - buyer's breach
under the provisions of S 70A-2-710 of the Utah U::C.

POINT 'IHREE:

COURSE OF DEALING. The lower Court should have

ruled that the parties course of dealings established a contractual
obligation on the defendant to pay the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees
under the provisions of

POINT rouR:

§§

70A-2-208 and

CXM-m LAW.

70A~2-202

of the Utah

u::c.

The lower court inproperly ruled that

the defendant was not bound to pay the plaintiff's attorneys' fees
on cOll!K>n principles and inproperly relied on inappropriate precedent
in its decision.
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POINT CNE::
A.

BINDING ADDITICNAL TERMS.

General Rule. For the creation of a binding sales contract,

Chapter 2 of the Utah Uniform Camnercial Code

[§§

?OA-2-101 et seq.,

hereinafter cited as "Utah UCC"] does not require that the acceptance of an offer be limited to the exact terms of the offer.

Sec-

tion 70A-2-207 of the Utah UCC provides:
70A-2-207. Additional terms in acceptance or confirmation.
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a
written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time
operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different fran those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to
the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract. Between merchants such
terms becane part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms
of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been
given or is given within a reasonable time after notice of
them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract
for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the
particular contract consist of those terms on which the
writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of
this act.
The contract involved in this case is for the sale and purchase
of goods from one merchant to another, and Chapter 2 of the Utah UCC
and those of its provisions specifically applicable to merchants

clearly apply.
The defendant's offer to purchased, memorialized in its purchase
orders or otherwise, were acknowledged and accepted by the plaintiff's
invoices which contained additional terms of credit relating to credit
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service charge ("interest") and costs of collection, including reasonable attorneys' fees.

As between these merchants, the teans of

credit "becane part of the contract" under S 70A-2-207 of the Utah
UCC since none of the statutory exceptions exists.

There is no

statutory requirement that the seller.' s form of acceptance be signed
by the buyer or its authorized representative.

B.

No

Restricted Offer.

The defendant's offer did not ex-

pressly limit the plaintiff's acceptance to the teans shown on its
purchase order.

In fact, the purchase price was not shown on the.def-

endant's purchase orders, but was negotiated and agreed upcrlotherwise.

C.

Material Alteration.

Although the statute itself does not

delineate what types of teans "materially alter" a contract within
the meaning of

§

70A-2-207 (2) (b), the Official Ccmnents* to S 2-207

of the UCC by the Camiissioners on Uniform State laws contain clear
guidelines for its interpretation.
Official Camnents 3 and 4 indicate that the test for material
alteration is whether the additional provisioos would "result in surprise or hardship if incorporated [into the agreement] without express awareness by the'other party •••• " Hence, the lower Court erred
in requiring a signature or other evidence of "express awareness."
Official Ccmnent 5 to

§

2-207 of the UCC states that "a clause

providing for interest on overdue invoices or fixing the seller's

*See Appendix B for the full text.
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standard credit terms where they are within the range of trade practice
and do not limit any credit bargained for" involves no element of un-

reasonable surprise and is to be incorporated into the contract between merchants unless timely objection is made.
Subsection (2) of § 70A-2-207 was sul:lnitted to the Utah legislature with Official Co!!inents which explained that terms of credit on
an invoice would be binding on a merchant-buyer, and the legislature
adopted it without modification.
Merchants in this state, including both the plaintiff and the
defendant, typically require the payment of the costs of collecting
a delinquent account, including reasonable attorneys' fees, as well
as credit service charges, as a part of their standard terms of
credit.

Therefore, the additional terms of credit contained on the

plaintiffs invoices are within the range of trade usage and do not
cause any "surprise" or "undue hardship" to the defendant (which
uses similar terms of credit on its invoices).
c)

Timely Objection. The defendant failed to make objection

within a reasonable time to the additional terms on the plaintiff's
invoices as required by §70A-2-207 (2) (c).

Such terms were on the

plaintiff's invoices since 1973, and although the defendant had an

open account before and after that time, it failed to object to
those terms until August, 1978 (except perhaps on specific isolated
transactions not related to this case).
d)

Earlier Precedent.

This Court did not discuss or apply the

Utah UCC in either Spanish Fork Packing Company v. House of Fine
Meats, Inc., 29 Utah 2d 312, 508 P.2d 1186 (1973) and B & R Supply
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Canpany v. Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216 (1972).

They

are inappropriate as precedent in this case where the ua:: clearly
applies and was raised in the lower Court as the plaintiff's chief
argument for its claim for attorneys' fees.
This is a case of first impression, apparently for other jurisdictions as well as for Utah.

Those two cases, and similar cases in

other jurisdictions, are clearly based on campn law prior to the
Uniform camiercial Code even though they were decided after its adoption.

Of course, the Court could not decide in the previous cases

an issue which was not raised by the parties.
e)

Conclusion. The Court below ruled that the. additional terms

of credit on the plaintiff's invoices were not binding on the defendant without an authorized signature or other evidence of consent.
The Utah
ants.

ua::

mandates that such terms are binding as between merch-

Since the offer was not restricted to its terms, since there

is no material alteration of the a<)'reement causing surprise or undue
hardship to the defendant, and since the defendant failed to object
until after five years of receiving the plaintiff's invoices, none
of the exceptions to

§

70A-2-207 of the Utah ua:: applies.

The current statutory provisions of the Utah ua:: were adopted
by the legislature to supersede prior statutory and case law.

The

law does not require actual consent but incorporates into contracts
"canmercial understandings" and the expectations of rrodern merchants.
(See Official Collnent 2 to

§

2-207 of the OX:.]

The defendant is

legally and contractually obligated to pay the plaintiff's attorneys'
fees.
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POINT 'MJ:

INCIDENI'AL DAMAGES

A. General Rule. The Official Canment* to

§

2-710 of the UCC

indicates that a buyer is liable to the seller for "all canmercially
reasonable expenditures made by the seller" as a result of the
buyer's breach.

The clear intent of the law is to make the non-

breaching party whole, not to merely canpensate for the principal
purchase price.

B.

Plaintiff's ArgtmlE!nt. The plaintiff's expenditure of attor-

neys' fees is a "ccmnercial reasonable" expense which resulted
directly fran the defendant's refusal to make payment in full on its
account.
If attorneys' fees are not awarded as valid incidental damages,
merchants (such as the plaintiff) will often be forced by delinquent
buyers (such as the defendant) to sell at a loss because collection
expenses can easily consume and exceed the profit and even the price
on the goods sold.
Although awarding attorneys' fees as incidental damages is inconsistent with the pre-UCC application of contract law, the Utah
legislature's clear intent under

§

70A-2-710 was to make a non-

breaching seller whole and to make a breaching buyer fully responsible for all expenses reasonably incurred because of its breach.

BLaw
forLibrary.
the full
ponsored*See
by theAppendix
S.J. Quinney
Fundingtext.
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POINT 'IHREE:

A.

CXXJRSE OF DEALIK:iS

General Rule.

J.\s

provided in

§§

70A-2-202- (a) and

?OA-2-208 of the Utah OCC, the acquiescence of a party may be
equivalent to assent W1der Utah contract law.

Because the defen-

dant failed to object for several years to the crediting of its
payments first to current interest and then to unpaid principal
(including past interest charges), the District Court awarded the
plaintiff interest, before and after judgment, at the rate shown
on the plaintiff's invoices and IOOnthly statement.
"Course of dealings" is analogous to estoppel, and differs
only in that one party relies on the silent acquiescence of the
other, rather than on explicit representations.

For many years,

the plaintiff in this case sold goods and extended credit to the
defendant in reliance on the defendant's acquiesence to the standard
terms of credit contained in the plaintiff's invoices.
The Utah OCC was adopted to relax the requirements for a fair
and enforceable contract.

The OCC does not require a signed con-

tract with each purchase.

Even at camxm law, printed conditions

on sales slips were regarded as part of the contract where those
conditions were expressly made a part thereof or they were so set
forth and were so related to the writing and the subject matter of
the agreement as to manifest to the other party an intent that they
were to be obligatory on him. 77 C.J .s., Sales,

B.

Application to This case.

§

71.

The defendant accepted goods

and credit for years knowing of the plaintiff's terms therefor.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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[See §§ 1 and 2 of the plaintiff's Reply Statement of Points and
Authorities dated April 5, 1979.]

The defendant's failure to object

to those terms of credit constitutes acquiescence to those terms.

The lower Court awarded interest to the plaintiff because of
the defendant's acquiescence in the plaintiff's billing practice,
including the caiputation of interest.

It is unfair to allow the

defendant to now claim that it never acquiesced· to pay cost of collection, including reasonable attorneys' fees where the other terms
of credit had been honored.

To

hold otherwise would allow long-

term merchant buyers to disregard credit terms at will.
In short, several years of dealings one with another made both
parties aware of unwritten but valid expectations which are enforceable under

§§

70A-2-202(b) and ?OA-2-208 of the Utah UCC.

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-12Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.

POINT FUUR:

A.

CCM-m LAW

Prior Cases--Factual Distinctions.

The defendant and the

District Court relied upon the rulings of this Court in two prior
cases, Spanish Fork Packing eanpany v. House of Fine Meats, Inc.,
29 Utah 2d 312, 508 P.2d 1186 (1973) and B

&

R Supply CanpanY v.

Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216 (1972).
In the B

&

R Supply case the Court ruled that where the buyer's

attention was never called to the seller's teans of credit printed
in "small inoonspicuous print" on the seller's.invoices, no oontract
was created for the payment of attorneys' fees.

In the 5panish

Fork Packing case the Court ruled that where the buyer had never
read the teans of credit on a seller's invoices, there was no "meeting of the minds" and no enforceable contract for attorneys' fees.
In the present case, however, the defendant-buyer was made
aware of the teans of credit contained on the plaintiff-seller's invoices and never denied knailedge thereof.
Statement

In the plaintiff's Reply

of Points and Authorities, the plaintiff clearly alleged

that JerryThom, an agent for the defendant and .an attorney, discussed with representatives of the plaintiff the provisions at the
bottan of the sales slip and that Mr. Thom was made aware that attorneys' fees were part of the contract between the parties.

Such

allegations were never controverted and were adopted by the District
Court in its Findings of Fact [q.v.J.

B.

Inapposite Precedent. The law applied

in the B & R Supply

and Spanish Fork Packing cases is inconsistent with the
and undermines the purpose of contract law.

caTllX)J'l

law .
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The dissenting justice in the Spanish Fork Packing case, Justice
Henriod, described that cased as being one:
• where actually there is no meeting of the minds, but where
there is a manifestation of mutual asset which appears to create
consensual liability by virtue of a sort of estoppel that says
one is bound if ostensibly he represents sanething without affirmatively denying liability therefor,--that he will respond
ex contractu, if one relies on his representations, either by
express authority or by implication. Spanish Fork Packing,
508 P.2d at 1188 (dissent).
The justice went on to say:
It is sanewhat ridiculous to conclude that the purchaser-defendant's
officials did not read the scrcalled "fine print" at the very head
of the invoice,--sane of which was not as "fine" as asserted. It
is also amazing to this writer that disclaiming liability for the
attorney's fee provision because nobody in authority bothered to
read it or question its obvious implications over a two-year
period falls squarely within the authorities cited in Slim Olson
[v. Winegar, 122 Utah 80, 246 P.2d 608 (1952)) based on acquiescence in the terms of an agreement by silence. 508 P.2d at 1188
and 1189 (dissent).
The Spanish Fork Packing and B & R Supply cases are inconsistent
with camon-law contract principles, trade usage, and the intent of the
Utah Uniform Carmercial Code.

If those cases are upheld and a similar

decision is reached in this case, the following legal advice will be
11Dre frequently given (and followed) in Utah:
[T)he way to avoid attorney's fees or any other prov1s1on in fine
print, simply is to ignore it, permit your employees to sign delivery invoices on which are terms, that if undesirable, could be
rejected, say you authorized them to sign for the delivery only
but not for anything appearing on the invoices, such as weight,
price, quality and the like, and you will not be responsible for
any of those items, and you then can put the seller to proof
dehors the invoice itself, and renege on even the delivery of
goods itself by saying, for example, that your employee was not
authorized to establish proof of delivery because that was reserved to the President of the corporation, who knew and saw
nothing about the invoice, what was on it, or what his employee's
signature looked like. 508 P.2d at 1189 (dissent).
In other words, those cases place an unconscionable burden on a selSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
-14Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ler and give the buyer the benefit of a bargain without obliging him to
honor it.
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CGICLUSIOO
A.
§

Binding Additional Terms:

The lCMer Court improperly disregarded

70A-2-207 of the Utah U:C both as to interest and attorneys' fees.

Since

the record indicates that there was no material alteration of the parties'
agreement and that the defendant failed to object to the additional terms
within a reasonable time, the terms of credit in the plaintiff's invoices
are a binding part of the sales agreement between the parties.

B.

Incidental Damages:

The provisions of

§

70A-2-710 require that

the plaintiff be made whole, and therefore the plaintiff should be reimbursed for all costs incurred because of the defendant's breach of its
pranise to pay on time, including reasonable attorneys' fees.

C.

Course of Dealing:

The parties' dealings with each other es-

tablished mutual expectations which the defendant should be obligated
to follCM and "estopped" fran denying under the provisions of

§§

70A-

2-208 and 70A-2-202 of the Utah UCC.

D.

Carmon Law:

The lower court improperly relied on the _§panish

Fork Packing and B & R Supply cases where the facts in the present case
distinguish it fran those previous cases, and where the law applied in
those cases is inconsistent with fairness, trade usage, and the canmonlaw principle of estoppel.
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APPENDIX "A"

70A-2-202. Final written expression-Parol or extrinsic evidence.Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties
agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties
as a final expression of their agreement with respect to auch terma u &re
included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or mpplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (section 70A-1-205) or by
course of performance (section 70A~2-208) ; and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the
writing to have been intended also as a complete and ucluaive
statement of the terms of the agreement.
70A-2-207. Additionli.l terms in acceptance or conflrmation.-(1) A
definite and 1euonable expression of acceptance or a written conftrmati1J11
which ia sent within a reasonable time operates u an acceptance even though
it 1tate1 terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon,
unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional
or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed u propoul& for addition
to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract
unle&B:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them bu already been given or is given
within a reuonable time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a COD·
tract is suflicient to eatabliah a contract for ule although the writings of the
parties do not otherwise e1tabliah a contract. In 1uch cue the terms of the
particular contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any 1upplementary terms incorporated under uy
other provisions of thia acL
70A-2-208. Course of performance or practical CODltnlcticm.-(1)
Where the contract for aale involves repeated occasions for performance by
either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of performance accepted
or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meuing of the agreement.
(2) The express terms of the agreement and any mch courae of
performance, as well as any course of dealing and uuge of trade, shall be
eonstrued whenever reuonable u consistent with each other; but when
such construction is unreasonable, express terms shall control courae of
performance and course of performance shall control both course of dealing
and uaage of trade (section 70A-1-205).
(3) Subject to the provisions of the nut section on modification and
waiver, such course of performance shall be relevant to show a waiver or
modification of any term inconsistent with such course of performance.
70A-2-710. Beller'• incidental damagea.-Incidental damage• to· an
aggrieved seller include any commercially reasonable charges! expenses or
commissions incurred in stopping delivery, in the transportation, care and
custody of goods after the buyer's breach, in connection with return or
resale of the goods or otherwise resulting from the breach.
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APPENDIX "B"

Official Canment to §2-202
Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: None.
Purposes:
1. This section definitely
jects:

-

statement of all the terms. If
the additional terms are auch
that, if agreed upon, they would
certainly have been included in
the document in the view of the
court, then evidence of their alleged making. must be kept from
the trier of fact.

~

(a) Any aaaumption that because a writing has been worked
out which is final on some matters, it is to be taken as i~clud
ing all the matters agreed upon;

Official camient to U::C

(b) The premise that the language used has the meaning attributable to such language by
rules of construction existing in
the law rather than the meaning
which arises out of the commercial context in which it was used;
and
(c) The requirement that a
condition precedent to the admissibility of the type of evidence
specified in paragraph (a) is an
original determination by the
court that the language used is
ambiguous.
2. Paragraph (a) makes admissible evidence of course of
dealing, usage of trade and
course of performance to explain
or supplement the terms of any
writing stating the agreement of
the parties in order that the true
understanding of the parties as
to the agreement may be reached.
Such writings are to be read on
the assumption that the course of
prior dealings between the parties and the usages of trade were
taken for granted when the document was phrased. Unless carefully negated they have become
an element of the meaning of the
words used.
Similarly, the
course of actual performance by
the parties is considered the best
·indication of what they intended the writing to mean.
3. Under paragraph (b) consistent additional terms, not reduced to writing, may be proved
unless the court finds that the
writing was intended by both parties as a complete and exclusive

§

2-207

Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: Sections 1and3, Uniform
Sales Act.
Changes: Completely rewritten
by this and other sections of this
Article.
Purposes of Changes:
1. This section is intended to
deal witli two typical situations.
The one is the written confirmation, ~·here an agreement has been
reached either orally or by informal correspondence between
the parties and is followed by one
or both of the parties sending formal memoranda embodying the
terms so far as agreed upon and
adding terms not discussed. 'The
<other situation is offer and acceptance, in which a wire or letter expressed and intended as an acceptance or the closing of an
agreement adds further minor
suggestions or proposals such as
"ship by Tuesday," "rush," "ship
draft against bill of lading inspection allowed," or the like. A frequent example of the second situation is the exchanl!'e of printed
purchase order and acceptance
(sometimes called "acknowledgment") forms. Because the forms
are oriented to the thinking of the
i·espective draftinl!' parties, the
terms contained in them often do
not correspond. Often the seller's
form contains terms different
from or additional to thos" set
forth in the buyer's form. Xe»erthcless. the 1mrties proceed with
the trnns:iction. [Comment 1 was
amended in 1966.]
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Official Carrnent to UCC §2-207 (cont'd)
2. Undor this Article a proposed deal which in commercial
understanding has in fact been
closed is recognized as a contract.
Therefore, any additional matter
contained in the confirmation 01·
in the acceptance falls within subsection (2) and must be 1·e1rnrdcd
as a proposal for an added term
unless the acceptance is made conditional on the acceptance of the
additional or different terms.
[Comment 2 was amended in
1966.]

3. Whether or not additional
or different terms will become
part of the agreement depends
upon the provisions of subsection (2). If they arc such as
materially to alter the original
bargain, they will not be included unless expressly agreed to by
the other party. If, however,
they are terms which would not
so change the bargain they will
be incorporated unless notice of
objection to them has already
been given or is given within a
reasonable time.
4. Examples of typical clauses which would normally "materially alter" the contract and so
result in surprise or hardshi1> if
incorporated without express
awareness by the other party
are: • a clause negating auch
·gtandard wananties as that of
merchantability or fitness for a
particular purpose in circumstances in which either warranty normally attaches; a clause
requiring ~ guaranty of 90 % or
100~ deliveries in a case such
as a contract by cannery, where
the usage of the u·adc allows
g-reater quantity leeways; a
,clause reserving to the seller the
power to cancel upon the buyer's
failure to meet any invoice when
due; a clause requiring that
complaints be made in a time
materially shorter than custom. ary or 1·easonable.

5. Examples
of
clauses
which in\•olve no element of un1·easonable surprise and which
therefore are to be incorporated
in the contract unless notice of
objection is seasonably given
are: a clause setting forth and
perhaps enlnrging slightly upon
the seller's exemption due to eupe1·vening causes beyond his
control, similar to those covered
by the provision of this Article
on merchant's excuse by failure
of presupposed conditions or a
clause fixing in advance any reasonable formula of proration under such circumstances;
a
clause fixing a reasonable time
for complaints within customary limits, or in the case of a purchase for sub-sale, providing for
inspection by the sub-purchaser;
a clause pro\·iding for interest
on overdue invoices or fixing the
seller's standard credit terms
where they are within the range
of trade practice and do not limit any credit bargained for; a
clause limiting the right of rejection for defects Which fall
within the customary trade tolerances· for acceptance "with adjustment" or otherwise limiting
remedy in a reasonable manner
(see Sections 2-718 and 2-719).
G. If no answer is received .
within a reasonable time after ad•·
ditional terms are proposed, it is
both fair and commercially sound
to assume that their inclusion has
been assented to. _Where clauses
on confirming forms sent by both
parties conflict each party must be·
assumed to object to a clause of
the other conflicting with one on
the confirmation sent by himself.
As a result the requirement that
there be notice of objection which
is found in subsection (2) is satisfied and the conflicting terms do
not become a part of the con tract.
The contract then consists of the
terms originally expressly agreed
to, terms on which the confirmations agree, and terms supplied by
this Act, including subsection (2).
The written confirmation is also
subject to Section 2-201. Under
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Official Carrnent to UCC

§

2-207 (cont'd)

that section a failure to respond
permits enforcement of a prior
oral agreement; under this section a failure to respon'd permits
additional terms to become part of
the agreement. [Comment 6 was
amended in 1966.]

ing of the agreement. · Express
mention '.of course' of performance elsewhere .fu. this.:Artiele
carries. ·nci ci>ntrai;. ·1mp1ication
when there ,. a fail~re.10 refer
to it in other sections. . '
3. Where it is difficult ·to determine whether a particular act
merely sheds light on the meaning of the agreement or represents a waiver of a term of the
agreement, the preference is in
favor of "waiver" whenever
such construction, plus the application of the provisions on
the reinstatement of rights
waived (see Section 2-209), ia
needed to preserve the flwble
character of commercial contracts and to prevent surprise or
other hardship.

7. In many cases, as where
goods are shipped, accepted and
paid for before any dispute arises, there is no question whether
a contract has been made. In such
cases, where the writings of the
parties do not establish a contract,
it is not necessary to determine
which act or document constituted
the offer and which the acceptance. See Section 2-204. The
only question is what terms are included in the contract, and subsection ( 3) furnishes the governing
rule. [Comment 7 was added in
1966.]

Official Ccxrment to UCC

§

4. A single occasion of coJi..
duct does not fall within the
language of this section but other sections such as the ones on
silence after acceptance and
failure to specify particular defects can affect the parties'
rights on a single occasion (see
Sections 2-606 and 2-607).

2-208

Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: No such general provision
but concept of this section recognized by terms such as
"course of dealing", .,the circumstances of the case," "the
conduct of the parties," etc., in
Uniform Sales Act.

Official Carrnent to UCC

§

2-710

Prior Uniform Statutory Pro\·ision: See Sections 64 and 70,
Uniform Sales Act.
Purposes: To authorize reimbursement of the seller for expenses reasonably incurred by
him as a result of the buyer's
breach. The section sets forth
the principal normal and necessary additional elements of damage flowing from the bre:ich but
intends to allow all commercially reas•mablc expenditures made
by the seller.

Purposes:
1. The parties themselves
know best what they have meant
by their words of agreement and
their action under that agreement is the best indication of
what that meaning was. This
section thus rounds out the set
of factors which determines the
meaning of the "agreement" and
therefore also of the "unless
otherwise agreed" qualification
to various provisions of this Article.
Under this section a
2.
course of performance is always
relevant to determine the mean-
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